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Panpsychism and Free Will 
A Case Study in Liberal Naturalism 
Philip Goff 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Durham 





There has been a resurgence of interest in panpsychism in contemporary philosophy of 
mind. According to its supporters, panpsychism offers an attractive solution to the mind-
body problem, avoiding the deep difficulties associated with the more conventional options 
of dualism and materialism. There has been little focus, however, on whether panpsychism 
can help with philosophical problems pertaining to free will. In this paper I will argue: (A) 
that it is coherent and consistent with observation to postulate a kind of libertarian agent 
causation at the micro-level, and (B) that if one if believes in libertarian agent causation at 
the macro-level, there are significant advantages in also postulating its existence at the 
micro-level. 
I 
Conservative and Liberal Naturalism: How do we find out what reality is like? It is 
broadly agreed that we should test our theory of reality against the data of observation and 
experiment. But, for any empirical data, there are always an infinite number of theories 
compatible with that data. Which one should we go for? The standard scientific approach is 
to go for the simplest. Thus, glossing over an awful lot of detail, we can sum up a broadly 
held view as to how we find out about reality as follows: 
 
Conservative Naturalism: Work out the simplest theory of reality that can account 
for the data of observation and experiment. 
 
It is not obvious, however, that the only data that should inform our theory of reality are 
empirical. Here are some other plausible candidates: 
 
Some Examples of Potential Non-Empirical Data 
 
• Consciousness: Feelings and experiences cannot be observed – you can’t look inside 
someone’s head and see their experiences – and hence a strict conservative 
naturalist has no basis for postulating consciousness.1 And yet we know that 
consciousness is real: nothing is more evident than the reality of one’s own feelings 
 
1 Some might be inclined to call our immediate awareness of our experiences a form of ‘observation.’ But this 
seems to me a very different use of the word ‘observation’ from the standard use in a scientific context. In any 
case, we could simply define conservative naturalism in terms of third-person observation to remove any 
ambiguity.  
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and experiences. It is thus plausible that the need to account for consciousness is a 
further datum an overall theory of reality must account for, over and above the data 
of observation and experiment. 
• Mathematical/Logical Truth: In addition to what we know about the world through 
perception, we also know through reason that reality is necessarily constrained in 
certain ways, e.g. contradictory states of affairs are impossible. It is arguable that a 
theory of reality must account both for the ground of these constraints and for our 
knowledge of them.  
• Value truths: David Enoch (2011) has argued that we need to postulate objective, 
irreducibly normative facts in order to make sense of what we’re doing when we 
deliberate. Some conservative naturalists may agree that irreducible normative facts 
are needed if deliberation is to make sense, but argue that in the absence of some 
independent reason to suppose that there are such facts, we must conclude that we 
are deluded in thinking that we can deliberate. However, a conservative naturalist 
responding in this way might be accused of double standards, as the empirical 
enquiry she is committed to relies on a series of anti-skeptical assumptions, e.g. that 
the external world exists and that careful use of our senses can tell us about it. Why 
is it permissible to adopt these anti-skeptical assumptions but impermissible to 
adopt Enoch’s anti-skeptical commitment to the possibility of rational deliberation? 
If Enoch’s argument is successful, we can take the reality of irreducible normative 
truths as a basic datum that our theory of reality is obliged to account for. 
• Free will: E. J. Lowe (2008) argued that a commitment to libertarian agent causation 
is pre-supposed by the belief that humans are able to respond to reasons. If all of 
our decisions are the result of prior causes, he argued, then normative facts have no 
role to play in explaining our behaviour. Again, some conservative naturalists may be 
tempted to infer from this that humans are not in fact able to respond to reasons; 
but, again, the charge of double standards may be used in response.2 We can see 
Lowe’s argument as an attempt to show that our theory of reality must be able to 
accommodate the reality of libertarian agent causation.  
 
We can define liberal naturalism as the view that some or all of the above as basic data that 
should inform our overall theory of reality, in addition to the data of observation and 
experiment. Of course, I have only gestured at the case for accepting each of the above kind 
of data. But I hope to have shown that a commitment to conservative naturalism cannot be 
assumed without argument to be the default position.  
 
The first non-empirical datum listed above is the most difficult to deny.3 It seems to many 
that the reality of their own consciousness is more evident than the reality of the external 
world. In that case, it seems strange to take empirical data as metaphysical data, but not the 
reality of experience itself. Accepting this first non-empirical datum does not in itself imply 
any particular theory of consciousness; it might turn out that the entities postulated to 
 
2 Of course, in the above two cases, many conservative naturalists will adopt naturalism about value and 
compatibilism about free will. All I mean to do here is gesture at the case that might be made for taking 
irreducible normativity and/or libertarian free will as basic data for a theory of reality. 
3 It is perhaps just as difficult to deny logical/mathematical truths (thanks to Guy Longworth for making this 
point). However, the question of whether logical/mathematical truths have metaphysical implications is more 
contentious than the question of whether experiential truths have metaphysical implications. 
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account for observation and experiment also happen to account for the reality of 
consciousness. But once we depart from conservative naturalism, this cannot be assumed at 
the start of enquiry.  
 
I have found in my discussions with philosophers, both amateur and professional, that a 
great deal of talking at cross purposes results from these methodological assumptions not 
being out in the open. I defend panpsychism: the view that consciousness is a fundamental 
and ubiquitous feature of reality. If we assume conservative naturalism, panpsychism is 
absurd, as empirical science does not tell us that consciousness is everywhere (indeed, 
arguably conservative naturalists ought to think that consciousness is nowhere). In many of 
the discussions I have, it quickly becomes clear that my opponents are assuming 
conservative naturalism and inferring on that basis that panpsychism is absurd. But I agree 
with that inference! To be sure, my opponents may hold that we have very good reason to 
adopt conservative naturalism (although the view is often assumed and rarely defended); 
still, it ought to be possible for the sake of discussion to consider the following conditional:  
 
If liberal naturalism (of a certain form) is true, panpsychism is plausible.  
 
It would be perfectly consistent for a conservative naturalist to think that panpsychism is 
implausible while agreeing with the above conditional. Sadly, the discussion often doesn’t 
get that far. 
 
In this paper, I will be considering pan-agentialism: the view that libertarian agent causation 
is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of physical reality. Conservative naturalists will take 
this position to be absurd, and so they should, given their methodological starting point. But 
the point of this paper is not to argue that pan-agentialism is plausible. It is rather to argue 
for the following conditional:  
 
If the reality of libertarian agent causation and consciousness are taken as basic data 
for a theory of reality, then pan-agentialism is plausible.  
 
I hope that readers, regardless of their own methodological commitments, can see the value 
of assessing this conditional. Afterall, even if Lowe’s argument (briefly described above) for 
a basic commitment to libertarian free will is unsound, it is not obviously unsound. It is 
worthwhile exploring the implications of methodological assumptions that are not obviously 
false.  
 
The pan-agentialist picture we will be exploring is a form of the Russellian monist theory of 
consciousness; in section II I will briefly outline and defend Russellian monism (a position I 
have defended at great length in Goff 2017 and 2019). In section III, I will outline my 
understanding of libertarian agent causation. In section IV, I will outline pan-agentialism, 




Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism: Feelings and experiences don’t seem to show up 
in the story of the brain that we get from neuroscience. Some respond to this by postulating 
consciousness outside of the physical workings of the body and the brain. At the other 
extreme, some conservative naturalists (Frankish 2016) deny that consciousness exists: if 
consciousness doesn’t show up in our third-person science of the body and brain, then we 
shouldn’t believe in it. From the perspective of liberal naturalism, a middle way between 
these two extremes is desirable. We liberal naturalists accept the reality of consciousness as 
a basic datum over and above the data of observation and experiment, but we seek the 
most simple and unified account of how this datum fits together with the data of third-
person science. 
Given these aims, panpsychism is an attractive option; in particular the form which has 
become known as ‘Russellian panpsychism,’ so called because it is inspired by certain theses 
defended by Bertrand Russell (1927) in the Analysis of Matter.4 The starting point of the 
Russellian panpsychist is that physical science doesn’t really tell us what matter is. This 
seems at first a bizarre claim; if you read a physics textbook you seem to learn all sorts of 
incredible things about the nature of space, time and matter. But Russellian panpsychists 
point out that physics, for all its richness, is confined to telling us about the behavioural 
dispositions of matter. Physics tells us, for example, that matter has mass and charge, 
properties that physics characterizes in terms of behaviour: charge is defined in terms of 
attraction and repulsion, mass is defined in terms of gravitational attraction and resistance 
to acceleration. Physics tells us nothing about the categorical properties underlying these 
dispositions. 
It is arguable, then, that there is a huge hole is our scientific story of the universe; the 
proposal of the Russellian panpsychist is to put consciousness in this hole. Their bold claim is 
that the categorical properties of matter are forms of consciousness. Physics tells us what 
mass and charge do, in the sense of capturing the behavioural dispositions that these 
properties endow to their bearers, but in their categorical nature mass and charge are forms 
of consciousness. 
What this offers us is a beautifully simple and elegant way of bringing together what we 
know about ourselves from the inside and what science tells us about the body and brain 
from the outside. There is just matter, nothing supernatural or spiritual, but matter can be 
described from two perspectives: physical science describes matter, as it were, from the 
outside, i.e., in terms of its behaviour; but matter from the inside, in terms of its categorical 
properties, is constituted of forms of consciousness.  
One might worry that it’s uneconomical and unnecessary to postulate experiential 
properties in all matter. The panpsychist needn’t claim that literally all things are conscious. 
The standard form of the view is that fundamental physical properties – mass, spin and 
charge – are incredibly basic forms of consciousness, and hence that the fundamental 
constituents of physical reality have incredibly simple forms of experience. But a 
panpsychist needn’t hold that all arrangements of micro-level entities result in subjects of 
experience; she needn’t hold, for example, that rocks and socks and conscious (as opposed 
 
4 For recent works on Russellian panpsychism, see Strawson 2006; Coleman 2014; Chalmers 2015; Goff 2017; 
Roelofs 2019; Mørch 2019, or the essays in Alter & Nagasawa 2015, Brüntrup & Jaskolla 2016 and Seager 2020. 
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to being constituted of micro-level entities that are conscious). Still, panpsychism implies 
that consciousness pervades the universe, and one might wonder why such a commitment 
is required in order to explain consciousness in brains. 
Those motivated by this concern might be interested to know that there are non-
panpsychist forms of this Russell-inspired approach to consciousness, according to which 
fundamental physical properties are forms of proto-consciousness. Proto-consciousness 
properties are categorical properties which are not themselves forms of experience but are 
somehow intrinsically suited to realizing consciousness when combined in certain complex 
forms.5 David Chalmers (2015) has dubbed these views collectively ‘panprotopsychism.’6 For 
those motivated by parsimony, however, it is important to appreciate that 
panprotopsychism is no more economical than panpsychism: both views postulate 
categorical properties that go beyond the dispositional properties revealed to us by physical 
science. And the trouble with panprotopsychism is that it invariably collapses into 
mysterianism, as we have no way of accessing the categorical nature of matter other than 
our immediate awareness of our own conscious experience.7 
Do we need categorical properties at all? Pan-dispositionalists argue that all fundamental 
properties are pure behavioural dispositions: that once you know everything there is to 
know what an electron does, you know everything there is to know about what an electron 
is.8 I’m not convinced pan-dispositionalism is intelligible, but even if there is a possible world 
in which pan-dispositionalism is true, that isn’t a world that contains consciousness.9 At 
least, that is what the classic arguments against physicalism – the knowledge and 
conceivability arguments – try to show.10 I have defended these arguments at length 
elsewhere and will not repeat them here. But the basic idea is that conscious experiences 
involve a qualitative character – what it’s like to see red, or to feel pain, etc. – and that that 
qualitative character cannot be captured in purely causal-dispositional terms. The fact that 
there’s consciousness entails that there’s more to our world than mere causal structure.  
I suppose one could have a view according to which pan-dispositionalism is true everywhere 
except for the brains of living organisms, which somehow grow their own categorical 
properties. But this view would be as ugly as dualism. Russellian panpsychism and Russellian 
 
5 More precisely we can say that facts about proto-phenomenal properties a priori entail facts about 
experience, such that this a priori entailment is not wholly dependent on the causal/dispositional features of 
the proto-phenomenal fact. In this way we can distinguish panprotopsychism from traditional forms of 
physicalism, which hold either than there is no a priori connection between physical facts and facts about 
experience – what David Chalmers (2002) calls ‘type-B physicalism’ – or that the a priori connection is 
dependent on functional/causal analysis of experiential facts – what Chalmers calls ‘type-A physicalism.’ 
6 For examples of panprotopsychism, see Stoljar 2001; Pereboom 2011; Coleman 2014.  
7 There is one form of panprotopsychism that does offer a positive characterization of the categorical 
properties of matter: panqualityism, prominently defended by Sam Coleman (2014). According to this view, 
the categorical properties of matter are unexperienced qualities. I raise problems for panqualityism in Goff 
2017, although it’s definitely a view that should be taken seriously.  
8 See Bird 2007; Ellis 2001, 2002; Molnar 2003; Mumford 2004. 
9 There is a familiar charge that pan-dispositionalism entails a kind of vicious circularity, as everything ends up 
being defined in terms of everything else; see Campbell 1976; Robinson 1982; Armstrong 1997, Lowe 2006, 
Goff 2017, Ch. 6.  
10 Jackson 1982; Chalmers 2009; Goff 2017. 
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panprotopsychism look to be the most elegant and parsimonious ways of fitting 
consciousness in to the world. The collective name for these views is ‘Russellian monism.’11 
Crosscutting the distinction between panpsychism and panprotopsychism is a distinction 
between strong and weak emergentist forms of Russellian monism.12 This distinction 
concerns the ontological status of emergent, macro-level, states of consciousness, such as 
the consciousness of humans and other animals. Weak emergentists think that facts about 
macro-level consciousness are wholly grounded in facts about micro-level 
(proto)consciousness. Strong emergentists, in contrast, think that facts about macro-level 
consciousness are fundamental facts in their own right, causally dependent on (but not 
grounded in) facts about micro-level (proto)consciousness. 
A couple of analogies might make the view clearer. For the weak emergentists, the 
relationship between macro and micro (proto)consciousness is a bit like the relationship 
between a party and the corresponding people partying. The fact that there is a party in a 
certain location is nothing over and above the fact that there are people dancing, drinking, 
etc. in that location. Similarly, according to weak emergentism, the fact that I am currently 
having an experience of red is nothing over and above the fact that some of the particles 
making up my brain are currently having such and such (proto)experiences and are arranged 
in such and such ways. For the strong emergentist, the relationship is more like the ritual 
dance of wizards that brings into being a demon; the demon is very much something over 
and above the wizards and their dancing, but the latter created the former and perhaps 
sustains it in existence. Similarly, according to strong emergentism, my consciousness is 
something over and above the (proto)consciousness of the bits of my brain, but my 
consciousness is nonetheless brought into being and sustained by the activities of my 
(proto)conscious parts.13 
If one accepts a strong emergentist position, and hence accepts that macro-consciousness 
can’t be reduced to micro-consciousness, why would one be a panpsychist? Why not simply 
hold that consciousness strongly emerges from bog standard physical stuff? In fact, if one 
accepts that macro-level conscious states are fundamental, then there is a powerful 
simplicity argument in favour of Russellian panpsychism (Goff 2017). In general, Russellian 
monism is a much simpler and more unified picture of nature than dualism, which gives us 
reason to prefer the disjunction of panpsychism and panprotopsychism over dualism. And, 
relative the background assumption that some conscious experiences are fundamental, 
anyone tempted to reject the panpsychist disjunct would need to come up with a reason for 
believing there is some other kind of fundamental property-determinable in addition to the 
determinable of consciousness. We have no way of accessing the categorical properties of 
matter outside of our own brains, and hence we would need a reason for supposing that 
matter has two kinds of fundamental categorical property – consciousness properties and 
some other kind – rather than just one.  
To summarise, we have four forms of Russellian monism:  
• Weak emergentist panpsychism 
• Strong emergentist panpsychism 
 
11 See Alter & Nagasawa 2015 for a collection of essays on Russellian monism. 
12 See Goff 2017 and Roelofs 2019 for defences of weak emergentism; see Mørch 2019 and Brüntrup 2016 for 
defences of strong emergentism.  
13 For more detail, see Goff 2017, Ch. 2. 
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• Weak emergentist panprotopsychism 
• Strong emergentist panprotopsychism 
As we shall see, the panlibertarian view which is the main focus of this paper is most 
naturally construed as a form of strong emergentist panpsychism.  
III 
 
Libertarian Agent Causation: Perhaps the best way to introduce agent causation views 
is in terms of the contrast with the orthodox view of mental causation in analytic philosophy 
of mind. According to this orthodox view, the actions of agents are caused by their mental 
states. Suppose Sarah raises her hand to ask a question in the Q&A after a talk. Orthodoxy 
might explain this in the following way: 
(A) Sarah has a desire D to ask a question 
(B) Sarah has a belief B that raising her hand is the best way to ask a question 
(C) D and B in conjunction cause Sarah’s hand to go up.14  
Agent causation views, in contrast, hold that, it is Sarah – and not her mental states – which 
is the cause of the hand raising (assuming this is a case of free action). I will understand 
libertarian agent causation to be agent causation in which the agent’s causing of a given 
event (in a case of free action) does not have a prior cause. The libertarian is not claiming 
that what happens lacks a cause; in our example, the hand raising is caused by Sarah. The 
point is that the Sarah’s causing of the hand raising does not itself have a cause (assuming 
this was a case of libertarian agent causation).15  
 
One common objection to libertarian agent causation is the charge that there is no coherent 
way of distinguishing an act of uncaused agent causation from a random and senseless 
occurrence.16 If Sarah’s raising of her hand cannot be causally explained in terms of any of 
her beliefs, desires, character and psychology more generally, then we seem forced to 
 
14 See, for example, Davidson 1963; Dretske 1988. 
15 O’Connor 2000; Clarke 2003; Steward 2012. There are subtle variants on the account of libertarian agent 
causation I have given. Clarke 1993 defends a form of agent causation view according to which both the agent 
and her mental states cause the result of the action (e.g. the hand raising). This view arises from the perceived 
need to account for the motivational strength of ‘reasons’, which Clarke, like many analytic philosophers, 
identifies with mental states of the agent. I think Lowe 2008 is closer to the truth when he follows Dancy 2000 
in thinking of reasons as external states of affairs, e.g. the fact that eating the cheese will bring me pleasure is 
a reason to eat it. As we will see, on my way of thinking about libertarian agent causation, the agent alone 
causes the result of the action (e.g. the hand raising) but is responding both to normative facts and to its 
conscious inclinations. O’Connor holds that the agent causes herself to have an intention to act rather than 
directly causing the result of the action; I’m happy to hold that sometimes the agent causes things to happen 
via causing intentions and sometimes brings about external events in a more direct manner (although, of 
course, still via some kind of chain of causation). 
16 See, for example, van Inwagan 2000. van Inwagan expresses this argument with the heuristic of imagining 
we ‘rollback’ the scenario after the decision has been made, to see what they would choose if the action were 
taken again. He supposes we have a situation which Alice freely decides to tell the truth. If God allows the 
action to be ‘replayed’ 1,000 times, in what percentage of the replays would Alice tell the truth and in what 
percentage would she lie? Answering this question, according to van Inwagan, would reveal the objective 
probabilities concerning how likely each possible action is. Like Lowe (2008), I see no reason to think there is a 
fact of the matter as to what would happen if God did this (nor that there is a modal truth expressing what 
would happen in an inter-world version of the rollback thought experiment).  
 8 
conclude that the supposed decision to act was really just a spontaneous and meaningless 
event – analogous to the random decay of a radioactive isotope – and not something we 
can in any reasonable sense call a ‘choice.’  
 
E. J. Lowe (2008) had a very simple, and in my view effective, response to this charge. What 
is distinctive about genuinely rational choices, as opposed to random happenings, is that the 
making of a rational choice involves responsiveness to normative facts, or at least to what 
are perceived to be normative facts. Suppose the following three facts obtain: 
• Sarah had an important contribution to make to the discussion (call this fact ‘F1’), 
• F1 counted in favour of Sarah’s raising her hand to ask a question (call this fact ‘F2’), 
• in making her decision Sarah was responding to F2. 
The fact that the initiation of a certain behavior involves responsiveness to normative facts 
is sufficient to make it a genuine choice rather than a random occurrence.17 
I think Lowe’s answer is good but incomplete. For not all of our choices involve responding 
to normative facts, or even to what we perceive to be normative facts. Sometimes our 
choices involve responsiveness to our conscious inclinations. By ‘conscious inclination’, I 
mean the felt desire to do something, e.g. the felt inclination to scratch an itch or to eat 
some chocolate. Suppose Anushka is trying to avoid cheese because she thinks veganism is 
morally obligatory, but she also has a strong conscious inclination directed towards eating 
the cheese that happens to be in front of her. After a little internal wrestling, Anushka ‘gives 
in’ to the inclination and eats the cheese. That Anushka’s initiation of behaviour can be 
explained in terms of her responsiveness to her conscious inclination would seem to be 
sufficient for making it a genuine choice rather than a senseless happening. 
Opponents of libertarian agent causation might argue that, in such a case, Anushka’s desire 
causes her action of consuming the cheese. Whether or not this is true, it certainly doesn’t 
phenomenologically seem to be true, at least not as a general rule. Perhaps when under 
immense duress, for example when undergoing torture, a person’s conscious inclinations, 
e.g. to avoid pain, compel their actions. But most of the time when we feel hunger, thirst or 
sexual desire, it seems as though we can choose whether or not to act on the basis of it. I 
am not arguing that this phenomenological impression is accurate; we are simply discussing 
whether or not libertarian agent causation is coherent. In order to demonstrate its 
incoherence, the opponent of libertarian agent causation would need an argument to show 
that how things seem, in this regard, makes no sense.  
I will call actions in which one entirely responds to one’s conscious inclinations, cases of 
‘arational agency.’ Human agency is a complex mixture of rational and arational agency, but 
some non-human animals may be purely arational agents: conscious subjects who are 
unaware of normative facts but are able to act in responsiveness to their conscious 
inclinations. 
 
17 Isn’t the claim that Sara’s choice involved responsiveness to a normative fact equivalent to the claim that 
that normative fact caused the resulting action (a challenge raised to me by Guy Longworth)? The view that 
reasons cause actions is normally associated with the view that reasons are identical with mental states such 
as beliefs and desires. But on the libertarian view I am considering here, normative facts are not constituted by 
mental states but are rather mind-independent facts outside of the causal realm. Normative facts impact the 
world, on this view, in virtue of rational agents recognising and responding to them.  
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The philosophy of mind literature tends to lump together many different things under the 
heading of ‘desire’: on the one hand, felt inclinations such as hunger and thirst, and on the 
other hand a very general notion of psychological aiming, e.g. Anushka’s being 
psychologically aimed at not eating cheese because she thinks veganism is morally 
obligatory. In doing this, we conflate what seem prima facie to be two very different kinds 
of free action. When Anushka ‘gives in’ to her craving and consumes the cheese in an animal 
fury, she is responding to her conscious inclinations. When David calmly and rationally 
decides to eat the cheese because he knows it will give him pleasure, he is responding to a 
normative fact: the fact that a certain non-normative fact – namely, that the cheese will give 
him pleasure – counts in favour of eating the cheese. At least, careful attention to our 
ordinary ways of thinking about ourselves suggests that there are these two quite different 
forms of responsiveness, and argument would be needed to undermine the coherence of 
this distinction. 
This paper is not arguing for or against the reality of libertarian agent causation; the claim is 
rather the conditional that if one is motivated to believe in libertarian agent causation, then 
one has grounds for taking pan-agentialism very seriously. Hence, I will assume in what 
follows the correctness of the libertarian agent causation position outlined above, in order 
to consider the attractiveness of pan-agentialism conditional on a commitment to 
libertarian agent causation. 
IV 
Pan-Agentialism: Pan-agentialism is the view that libertarian agent causation is a 
fundamental and ubiquitous feature of nature. I will begin by outlining a specific version of 
pan-agentialism, before going on to argue that it has significant advantages over the 
standard metaphysical framing of a commitment to libertarian agent causation.  
Pan-agentialism is a form of powers realism, which I understand to be the view that causal 
facts are grounded in the causal powers of objects. On a standard form of powers realism, a 
power is defined by its stimulus and its manifestation. The manifestation of fragility, for 
example, is breaking, which is stimulated when the bearer of fragility is impacted with 
sufficient force. Powers realism tends to go along with what we might call causation by 
compulsion, whereby the manifestations of powers at earlier times stimulate powers at 
later times, a bit like a chain of dominoes. On the pan-agential view, in contrast, a power is 
definitionally associated with a manifestation but not a stimulus; instead, the power 
manifests when and only when its bearer chooses. According to pan-agentialism, this is the 
entire story of causation, right down to the micro-level where we find purely arational 
agents. Nothing compels a particle to act, on this view, the particle chooses for itself.18 
One might wonder how this is consistent with observation. If fundamental particles are 
freely choosing when to manifest their causal powers, why do we not have more of a 
chaotic world? A pan-agentialist response to this worry can build on the following principle: 
Desire Magnetism – If there is a purely arational conscious subject S, such that (A) S 
has a strong conscious inclination to Φ, (B) S has no conscious inclination not to Φ 
(or to do something inconsistent with Φing), and (C) S is able to Φ in response to its 
strong conscious inclination to Φ and is aware that it is able to do so, then S is 
 
18 I will think of micro-level entities as particles, for the sake of simplicity.  
 10 
inevitably going to Φ (unless some of (A)-(C) are removed before S has a chance to 
Φ).19    
Mature human beings don’t always act on their conscious inclinations. Even if Anushka has a 
strong conscious inclination to eat the cheese, she may refrain from doing so because of the 
perceived normative fact that veganism is morally obligatory. In this case, Anushka responds 
to a perceived normative fact – the fact that veganism is morally obligatory – over her 
conscious inclination to eat the cheese. But if a very young child has a strong conscious 
inclination to eat some cheese, knows it is able to eat it and has no desire to the contrary, 
and is too young to rationally deliberate, then the child is certainly going to try to eat the 
cheese. Everything in the child’s psychology inclines her to eat the cheese and nothing 
inclines her not to. Of course, something could get in the way and stop the child responding 
to its inclination; a lightning bolt could hit before she has time to choose. But if her capacity 
to choose is left free to run its course, she’s going to eat the cheese. Why would she not? 
Desire Magnetism is the arational analogue of a principle Richard Swinburne (2004) holds is 
true of rational agents: 
Reasons Magnetism – If there’s a conscious subject S such that (A) S is aware that 
she has an all things considered very strong reason to Φ, (B) S is able to Φ in 
response to this reason and is aware that she is able to do so, and (C) S has no 
conscious inclination not to Φ, then S will inevitably Φ (unless some of (A)-(C) are 
removed before S has a chance to Φ).20   
Ordinary human adults regularly suffer from weakness of the will. Anushka strongly believes 
that she shouldn’t eat the cheese but has an incredibly strong conscious inclination to eat it; 
in such situations, it’s a wide-open question whether she will choose to follow her 
inclinations or to follow what, by her lights, she has strong reason to do. But if Anushka 
judges that she has overwhelming reason not to eat the cheese and has not the slightest 
conscious inclination to do so, then of course she will refrain from eating it. In the 
description of the situation, there is nothing that could possibly explain why she would 
choose any other course of action. On the basis of something like the above principle, 
Swinburne argues that God’s perfect goodness follows from Her omniscience and 
omnipotence. God knows what She ought to do (i.e. what she has on balance most reason 
to do) and has no conscious inclination to do otherwise; it is inevitable, on this basis, that 
God will do what She ought. 
With Desire Magnetism in place, the pan-agentialist is able to account for the predictability 
of nature. She can hold that micro-level entities at earlier times cause micro-level entities at 
later times to have strong conscious inclinations to act in a certain way, and that the later 
micro-level entities are able to act on those inclinations and are aware of that fact. Given 
Desire Magnetism, it will follow that the later particles will inevitably act on their 
inclinations and hence behave predictably (assuming they have no conscious inclinations to 
 
19 I am building into ‘S is able to Φ’ not only that S has the capacity, but that the right conditions are in place to 
enable S to act upon that capacity. 
20 I present the principle here in a slightly modified form.  
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the contrary, which could be built into the theory). Strictly speaking, particles are free, but 
they’re too stupid to do anything other than follow their inclinations.21   
In what sense is it inevitable that particles will follow their inclinations? I suggest the pan-
agentialist should take the simple view that this word expresses metaphysical necessity: in 
any possible world in which particles have the same inclinations and the same causal 
powers, they behave in exactly the same manner.  
An obvious worry arises at this point. If how particles will behave at later times is 
metaphysically necessitated by facts about earlier times, one might reasonably wonder in 
what sense they could have done otherwise. The pan-agentialist can respond that a particle 
is able to behave otherwise in the sense that it is part of the essential nature of its causal 
powers that it could have done otherwise. A theological analogy may help here. Could God 
have tortured children for fun? The answer is surely ‘yes’: God is omnipotent, and it is part 
of the essential nature of omnipotence that an omnipotent being can do anything, which 
logically entails being able torture children for fun. And yet, there is no possible world in 
which God tortures children for fun, as this would be inconsistent with God’s perfect 
goodness (which, if Swinburne is right, follows from Her omniscience and omnipotence, 
given Reasons Magnetism). Similarly, the pan-agentialist may hold that the causal capacities 
of particles are essentially such that the particles could act differently; at the very least they 
are able not to manifest their powers. And yet, one can plausibly argue, on the basis of 
Desire Magnetism, that it is inevitable – metaphysically necessary – that they will manifest 
their powers. 
A sense of inconsistency remains; it just seems contradictory to claim both:  
(A) event E makes it necessarily the case that X will Φ  
and yet also: 
(B) X is capable of not Φing, even after E has occurred.  
I think this sense of inconsistency arises from implicitly understanding relationships of 
metaphysical necessity between contingent events as cases of causation by compulsion. If 
E1 necessitates E2, we read that as E1 compelling E2 to occur. However, the pan-agentialist 
can hold that E1 metaphysically necessitates E2 not by compelling E2 into being but by 
making it inevitable that a free agent will bring about E2. 
V 
Advantages: Even supposing pan-agentialism is coherent, what reason does a believer in 
libertarian agent causation have to take it seriously (recall we are assessing the plausibility 
of pan-agentialism conditional on a commitment to libertarian agent causation)? The most 
significant advantage of adopting pan-agentialism is that it enables a libertarian agent 
causalist to avoid what Randolph Clark (2003) has called ‘the uniformity of causal power’ 
 
21 How should a pan-agentialist make sense of probabilistic causation? One option is to build the probabilistic 
element into the manifestation. To take a toy example, suppose C-type particles cause E1-type events 90% of 
the time and E2-type events 10% of the time. The pan-agentialist can explain this with the hypothesis that C-
type particles have a power to create an event that will either be an E1-type events or a E2-type event, such 
that there is a 90% change that it will be an E1-type events 10% it will be a E2-type. 
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objection. In most agent causation views, causal relations in the inanimate world are 
radically different from causal relations involving agents. In the animate world, it is generally 
assumed, there is causation by compulsion: prior events compel later events to occur. 
Whilst in humans (and perhaps some other animals), according to libertarian agent 
causalism, we find the emergence of a radically new form of causation, whereby an entity 
freely chooses to initiate forms of behaviour. For naturalists who seek as simple and unified 
a view of reality as possible, this is not a good picture. 
I suspect this is at the root of much hostility towards libertarian agent causation views. 
Many philosophers have a hunch that libertarian agent causation is in some way at odds 
with contemporary science, despite the fact that there is no observational evidence against 
it.22 This sense of a tension between science and agent causation may be due to the deep 
disunity in the standard libertarian agent causation picture, according to which the causal 
powers associated with humans are radically different from those we find in the scientific 
story more generally. The pan-agentialist, however, avoids this problem altogether. On her 
view, there is only one form of fundamental causal interaction: free agential causation. 
But does the pan-agentialist really avoid disunity in nature? Even if particles ’activate’ their 
manifestations, this seems to have little to do with choice as it occurs in humans, as the 
latter is essentially directed at achieving certain goals. When I choose to go to the fridge to 
get a beer, I’m consciously aware of the state of affairs I’m aiming at bringing about. 
Particles, in contrast, do not have the mental sophistication to understand the things they 
make happen. If particles really do choose, then in some sense they must represent the 
options available to them, but a plausible version of pan-agentialism would hold that a 
particle’s options are represented to it simply as brute options: at the minimum simply ‘DO!’ 
(where the particle, in principle, has the option of not doing). This seems on the face of it to 
have little in common with the goal-directed choice of humans, and hence we seem not to 
have avoided a sharp division between the causal powers of humans and the causal powers 
of particles. 
Clearly the free choices of humans are very different from those of particles. I believe, 
however, that the pan-agentialist can tell a story as to how the kind of ‘choice’ adult 
humans have arises from the kind of ‘choice’ particles have:  
There is something the agency of a human infant has in common with the agency of 
a particle: in both cases, possible choices are represented to the agent as brute 
options (although, of course, the possible choices available to the infant are vastly 
more complex than those available to the particle). The libertarian capacities of the 
infant are powers to make changes in its brain, although obviously the infant doesn’t 
conceive of these powers as such; the infant just knows that it can do this or that, 
and that these options correspond in some way with what it feels inclined to do. As 
the infant develops, those brute options come to be represented in terms of their 
distal effects (e.g. raising an arm) just as the ‘buzzing blooming confusion’ of 
experience – to use William James’s expression – comes to be represented as 
objects in an environment.23  
 
22 There are the much discussed Libet (1985) experiments and more recent experiments (Soon et al 2008) 
along similar lines. Like many philosophers, I think the implications of these experiments are grossly 
exaggerated; I discuss this in Goff 2019: Ch. 5. There are also causal closure considerations, discussed below. 
23 James 1890/1981, p. 488. 
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Of course, this story is, to an extent, subject to empirical confirmation/disconfirmation, but 
it seems no less empirically plausible than the kind of story of development that opponents 
of libertarian agent causation might tell. By adopting this story, the pan-agentialist can 
plausibly hold that adult human choice intelligibly arises from something not dissimilar to 
particle choice (although of much greater complexity). 
Like any libertarian, a pan-agentialist will hold that human choices could not, even in 
principle, be predicted from knowing the kind of facts physical science teaches us about the 
body and the brain. To put it vividly, Laplace’s demon could know every position of every 
particle in Anushka’s body, and have complete knowledge of the laws of physics, but would 
still not be able to predict whether or not Anushka will eat the cheese that is tempting her. 
For the pan-agentialist, this is because the laws of physics track the free choices of purely 
arational micro-level entities in response to their conscious inclinations. However, unlike an 
electron, Anushka believes that there are objective reasons to act in certain ways; she may 
choose to respond to her inclinations, but she may also choose to respond to what, by her 
lights, she has reason to do. In so far as Anushka is responding to (what she believes to be) 
objective reasons rather than inclinations, her behaviour will depart from the causal 
processes that are tracked by physics (i.e. those grounded in the free choices of arational 
micro-level entities acting in response to their inclinations).24  
Doesn’t it follow that a new type of causal relationship has emerged, one that involves 
responsiveness to normative facts? Yes and no; the pan-agentialist should hold that 
particles do not respond to normative facts but only because they have no understanding of 
normative facts. Of course, it is only when we have creatures with an understanding of 
normativity that we get creatures able to respond to normativity. But the pan-agentialist 
can hold that the only new thing at play here is the understanding of normativity: free 
choice in conjunction with understanding of normativity yields responsiveness to 
normativity. Of course, we still have the massive challenge of explaining how human beings 
come to have knowledge of the normative, but this is a challenge on any view.25 
The second advantage of pan-agentialist arises from its adoption of the more general 
panpsychist position. Most libertarian agent causalists are dualists, holding either that the 
mind/person is distinct from the brain/body (substance dualism), or that certain properties 
of the mind/person are distinct from the physical properties of the brain/body (property 
dualism). Dualism is an inelegant, disunified and unparsimonious picture of nature, with the 
mental properties of humans (and perhaps animals) radically different from the physical 
properties we find in the rest of nature. For the panpsychist, in contrast, the agent and her 
mental states are part of the intrinsic nature of the brain and its physical states. Human 
persons are simply a highly evolved form of what we find in nature more generally. 
Libertarian agent causalists hold that the free choices of humans involve irreducible causal 
interactions. This commitment almost certainly entails the existence of fundamental objects 
and properties at the macro-level, as the physical processes associated with human choice 
occur at the macro, not the micro, level. Hence, the pan-agentialist will probably adopt a 
 
24 Given that we’re working within a strong emergentist framework, there will presumably be strongly 
emergent conscious inclinations at the macro-level, and in so far as the strongly emergent macro-level subject 
is responding to these inclinations, this may be a further reason why its behaviour departs from what would be 
predicted by basic physics (which ex hypothesi tracks the inclinations of fields/particles).  
25 At least our knowledge of the normative is a challenge on any robustly realist view of normativity, but the 
libertarian agent causalist view we are working with assumes such robust realism. 
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strong emergentist form of panpsychism, according to which the part of the brain 
associated with human consciousness is a fundamental entity and the states of the brain 
associated with human choice are fundamental properties. Reality, for the pan-agentialist, is 
layered rather than flat. Despite this, the pan-agentialist picture is significantly more simple, 
elegant and unified than that of the dualist. 
As a form of panpsychism, pan-agentialist is also consistent with physical causal closure, the 
principle that every (caused) physical event has a sufficient physical cause. The actions of 
my mind just are the actions of my brain. Pan-agentialist is not consistent with micro-
physical causal closure, the principle that every (caused) physical event has a sufficient 
physical cause at the micro-level (or is grounded in an event that has a sufficient physical 
cause at the micro-level). As discussed above, pan-agentialist is committed to the view that 
human choices, at least those involving responsiveness to reasons, cannot be predicted 
from causal goings on at the micro-level. But it’s not clear that we have good reason to 
believe micro-level causal closure. There are no peer reviewed scientific papers offering 
observational grounds for thinking that the causal powers of any large part of the brain are 
completely determined by the causal powers of the neurons and neurotransmitters which 
compose it.26 At any rate, if there is observational support for micro-level causal closure, 
this would give us grounds for doubting any form of libertarian agent causalism. 
IV 
Conclusion: I have not in this paper given grounds for thinking that pan-agentialist is true, 
or even that it is plausible. I have rather tried to argue for a conditional: if we start from a 
commitment to libertarian agent causation, one has reason to take pan-agentialism very 
seriously. If we are to suppose that libertarian agent causation exists, it would be better to 
suppose that it is a quite general feature of matter rather than being something that 
magically popped up when human beings came on the scene. To put it another way, if we 
are radically free, then probably particles are too.27 
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